In this final issue of the South Sudan Series, this series has found that although the 2005 CPA managed to bring to an end the protracted conflict between north and south Sudan and resulted in independence of the south from the north, its outcome beyond these has been disappointing and detrimental to the long term peace and stability for south Sudan, both as a region then as an independent sovereign state. The CPA ignored the engagement of the population in its development. In addition, it conventionally frustrated any form of covenant that existed or had been developed between the SPLA and the population of the south as a result of their support of the rebellion. Instead, the CPA replaced the population with oil using it as a basis upon which the belligerents would build their governance and draw their legitimacy.

The implication of this is that the CPA successfully created the new state of South Sudan but systematically inhibited its development of a monopoly over access to the means and exercise of force and taxation. These are attributes that Di John (2010) and North (1999) point to as being fundamental in enhancing a state’s resilience and to the reduction of the prospect of non-state actors financing rebellion or challenging states authority in the delivery of services to its population. Because of the inherently dual political and economic nature of taxation, the monopolisation of tax collection not only represents the basic permeability of the state in all sectors of the economy but also makes it difficult for non-state rivals to challenge the state’s authority (Di John 2010). On the contrary, the CPA created a government with extremely narrow tax base heavily dependent on unearned oil revenue limiting political interactions between the state officials and the population. Consequently, the construction of a government whose structure was fundamentally established around oil wealth limited the state’s ability to permeate its society. Hence to date, the South Sudan government is far from being resilient due to its weak presence in most areas of its territory.

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Al-mahidi, As-Sadiq. (2006), The limitations of bilateral governance, in , in Simmons, M and Dixon, P (2006), Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan’s Conflict: Conciliation Resources, issue 18, 2006

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Cramer, Christopher and Paul Richards (2011), “Violence and War in Agrarian Perspective,” Journal of Agrarian Change 11, no. 3, pp. 277-297.

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Death, C. (2014) (ed), Critical Environmental Politics (Routledge) chapters 19 (Watts and Peluso) and 23

De Waal, Alex (2006), The DPA and its national context, in Simmons, M and Dixon, P (2006), Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan’s Conflict: Conciliation Resources, issue 18, 2006

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Di John, Jonathan (2010) Development as State-Making: Taxation, Resource Mobilisation and State Performance: Crisis State research Centre, Working Paper no. 84, Series 2.

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Tania Kaiser (2006), Hopes for the Future: the case of Sudanese Refugees in Uganda, in Simmons, M and Dixon, P (2006), Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan’s Conflict: Conciliation Resources, issue 18, 2006

Van Der Ploeg, Frederick (2011), Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?, Journal of Economic Literature 49, pp. 366-420.

Vergara-Camus, L. (2014) “Taking Control: Decommodification and Peasant Alternatives  to Neoliberalism in Mexico and Brazil” In: Pradella, Lucia and Tom Marois, eds., Polarizing Development. Alternatives to Neoliberalism and the Crisis, London, Pluto Press, pp. 169-179

Wennmann, Achim (2007), The Political Economy of Conflict Financing: A Comprehensive Approach Beyond Natural Resources, Global Governance, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Vol. 13, No. 3 (July-Sept. 2007), pp. 427-444

Wise, Raúl Delgado (2013). The Migration and Labor Question Today. Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine. Vol. 64 Issue 9, p25-38.

Chapters in Edited Books:

De Soysa, Indra (2000), “The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paucity?”, in Berdal, Mats and David Malone (eds.), Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Boulder and London: IDRC/Lynne Rienner.

Duffield, Mark (1994), “The Political Economy of Internal War: Asset Transfer, Complex Emergencies and International Aid”, in Macrae, J. and A. Zwi with M. Duffield and H. Slim, War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies, Zed Books/Save the Children Fund: London, pp.50-69): ISBN 1-85649-291-5.

Fairhead, James (2000), “The Conflict over Natural and Environmental Resources”, Chapter 4 in Nafziger, E.W, F. Stewart and R. Värynen (eds.) (2000), War, Hunger and Displacement: Volume 1: The Origins of Humanitarian Emergencies –War and Displacement in Developing Countries, OUP: Oxford.

Hamid, B., Mohammad. (1988) Devolution and The Problems of national Integration, in Conference on North-South Relations in the Sudan since the Addis Ababa agreement, Arou, M. K., & Yongo-Bure, B., 1988. Part of the proceedings of the Conference on North-South Relations in the Sudan since the Addis Ababa Agreement. Khartoum: University of Khartoum, Institute of African and Asian Studies.

Komey, K., Guma. (2013), Back to war in Sudan : flawed peace agreement, failed political will, in Chr. Michelsens institute., Ahmad, A. G. M., & Sørbø, G. M., 2013. Sudan divided: Continuing conflict in a contested state. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Othwonh Dak. (1988) Southern Region: Decentralisation or Recentralisation, in Conference on North-South Relations in the Sudan since the Addis Ababa agreement, Arou, M. K., & Yongo-Bure, B., 1988. Part of the proceedings of the Conference on North-South Relations in the Sudan since the Addis Ababa Agreement. Khartoum: University of Khartoum, Institute of African and Asian Studies.

Sorbo, G. M & Ahmed, A., G (2013), Sudan’s Durable Disorder, in Chr. Michelsens institute., Ahmad, A. G. M., & Sørbø, G. M., 2013. Sudan divided: Continuing conflict in a contested state. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Tubiana, Jerome (2013), Darfur after Doha, in Chr. Michelsens institute., Ahmad, A. G. M., & Sørbø, G. M., 2013. Sudan divided: Continuing conflict in a contested state. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Yongo-Bure, B., (1993), The Underdevelopment of the Southern Since Independence, in Daly, M., & Sikainga, A. A. (1993). Civil war in the Sudan. London: British Academic Press.

Official Documents:

All Africa Conference of Churches., New Sudan Council of Churches., & National Council of Churches of Kenya., 1998. The Sudan at war, in search of peace: Report of a consultation convened by churches and Christian councils of the Great Lakes-Horn of Africa Region, April 7-8, 1998, Karen, Nairobi, Kenya. [Nairobi?: s.n..

International Crisis Group (2006) Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead, A Policy Report, www.crisisgroup.org

International Crisis Group (2015) Sudan and South Sudan’s Merging Conflicts. African Report No. 223, 29 January 2015

International Crisis Group (2011) Politics and Transition in the New South Sudan. African Report No. 172, 4 April 2011

UNDP (2012) South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics: South Sudan Millennium Development Goal Status Report.

United Nations (2005) The Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between The Government of The Republic of The Sudan and The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army

World Bank (2003), Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, Washington: World Bank (ISBN 0821354817), Chapter 3.

3.1      Political-Economic Dimensions

Issues 1&2 reveals that the CPA was only a bilateral agreement between two fighting group without any involvement of either political parties, NGOs, who have throughout the conflict provided vital functions of civil society or the population itself. Despite this challenge, the endorsement of the CPA by excluded parties would still be possible through a participatory form of implementation of the provisions of the agreement (Ahmed 2010; ICG 2011). ICG (2011) argues that this would be dependent on two factors.

Firstly, the extent to which the SPLA would allow for the opening-up of a political space that would enable a vibrant multi-party representative system of democracy. And the second being the ability and willingness of the elites to undertake a democratic reform within the SPLM/A transforming it from a militarised concept of politics to representative democratic politics. Failure to undertake these forms of adjustment would risk reconstructing the pre-CPA form of government characterised by authoritarian and heavily centralised rule proving a stumbling block to state-making.

However, political economy analysis presented in issue one, seems to present a contrary view to the above. The thesis argues that although issues of democratisation and transparency are important, it is how a state finances its most basic functions that are more important. It is how domestic resources are used to finance public goods and services that is fundamental for building state legitimacy, (Olson 1965; Tilly 1990; North 1999). According to Di John (2010), because taxation is inherently political, taxation not only enhances government accountability, it also provides a focal point around which various interest groups can be mobilised (Di John 2011a). In contrast, southerners’ mobilisation to support the SPLA was not taxation related. Therefore, the political economy thesis of taxation might prove very problematic when used in the south Sudan context as revealed in issue one (1.2.5) in isolation of other dimensions.

Two overarching factors correlate with this explanation. First is the ease with which the southern population seems to be mobilized along non-economics aspects such as religion, tribal and ethnicity. This illustrates the fragility of the state, while the second is the construction of a ‘rentier state’[1] by the CPA whose structure and government is established around oil revenue which restricts the belligerents from diversifying the country’s tax base beyond the remits of oil revenue. Di John (2010) argues that the diversity of the tax base is a good indicator of how the state engages with different sector and regions, and to a much greater extent indicative of the degree to which a state authority permeates society.

Nevertheless, the CPA still managed to produce significant optimism among the population. This optimism however was short-lived as the promised moment of the dawn of a new era turned increasingly dispiriting with each level of implementation and years that passed.

3.2.      Multidimensionality Ignored

The Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 provides a classic example of the importance of understanding and contextualising the interaction between socio-economic, political and historical dimensions in resolving conflicts. The analysis in this series reveals that although the 1972 pact successfully brought an end to the fighting between the GoS and Anya-nya in January 1972, the GoS and the GoSS needed to embark on the transition from war to peace (Ahmed 2006; Johnson 2011). This involved the development of socio-economic, political and natural situations that would build trust and the spirit of voluntarism; the creation of security and removal of barriers to sustainable peace (ibid. issue one). The failure to achieve the transformation necessary exacerbated by external factors, most notably the debt and global commodity price crises of the 1970s, accelerated the need for political and economic reorientation with far reaching devastating impact for the population (Lako 1993; Johnson 2011).

To illustrate this argument, Johnson (2011) and Lako (1993) point out that as a result of the debt crisis and the global fall in agricultural commodity prices in the 1970s, the GoS became dependent on the US and IMF not only as a measure of renegotiating the rescheduling of its debt servicing and further borrowing, but rather on foreign aid through USAID. According to Johnson, Sudan became the largest recipient of US foreign aid in the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa receiving approximately $1.4 billion between 1971 and 1985 (Johnson 2011). As a precondition for receiving this financial support, the US and IMF demanded for Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs), a concept fundamental to the neoliberal capitalist development (ibid. pg. 19-22) in most developing countries from 1980s to present.

To warrant political stability and thwart the pessimism of SAPs, the GoS under the auspice of national reconciliation opted to join forces with the Umaa and the Muslim Brothers who also demanded a reform of national laws and justice to adhere to Islamic principles as a precondition for their acceptance of national reconciliation (Johnson 2011). This move however systematically ignored the involvement of the GoSS and its population, a move that compromised the provision of the Addis Ababa pact while putting further pressure on the already weak state institutions in the south (Ahmed 2010; Lako 1993; Johnson 2011). This resulted in dissatisfaction in the population of the south. The SPLA took advantage of this situation mobilising support to launch a liberation movement. It can therefore be pointed out that the lack of representation and involvement of the south Sudan elites together with the weak state institutions generated grievances that later fueled conflict.

3.3       Factors Limiting Effectiveness of the CPA

3.3.1    Peace Approach:

The CPA negotiators took on a one-dimensional model of peace negotiation inherently characterised by elements of exclusion and militarised and mineral resource focus. Simon and Dixon (2006) persuasively present that the IGAD’s approach to diplomacy adopted during the protracted negotiation characterised by firm leadership and organisation was a militarised model well suited for a process particularly structured to deal with belligerents. Although this approach, unlike the previous peace attempts, seems to have subsequently succeeded in ending the fighting and ensuring secession, it was too tight and focused on a very narrow conception of north-south Sudan contention.

The exponents informed by the resource curse[2] explanation of civil conflict postulated that south Sudan is almost exclusively dependent on oil money; the national politics, decentralization of authority, development and state capacity, that is government, must be centrally built around oil (ICG 2011). The proponents to this model broadly informed by the resource curse’s rentier state argument that when a state like Sudan gains a large proportion of their revenues from external sources, such as oil money, it reduces the need for state decision-makers to levy domestic taxes on its population causing state leaders to be more predatory and less accountable to its civil population. By resolving the management, access and distribution of oil revenue, north-south conflict would be addressed. However, the resource curse thesis has come under fierce criticism, most significantly among academics. Rose (2004) for instance argues that resources in themselves do not cause conflict, rather pre-existing state institutions in these countries that seem historically dependent on oil/mineral resources tend to be weak.

This essay argues that the resource curse model adapted by exponents of the CPA does not hold in understanding conflict and the situation in South Sudan. However, the model plays an important role in demonstrating that an economy may be considered to be dependent on oil mineral revenues just because it failed to diversify its economy either as a result of a dysfunctional government before mineral discovery or because of years of organised violence before the civil war. Analysis of the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement (ibid. chapter one) revealed that the inadequate capacity and the non-existence of state institutions responsible for managing different sectors in the south that would facilitate the process of state-building, establish/manage state-population interactions through taxation, law and justice, capital development and provision of security was the single most fundamental reason for the return to war in 1983 and not the dependence on oil revenue.

As a result of exclusion and non-engagement of the south Sudanese population and the undermining of the complexities within the south itself, managing South Sudan’s ethno-regional diversity continues to be a major challenge to both the GoSS and the interventionists. As the CPA era came to an end with independence in 2011(Johnson 2011; ICG 2011; Young 2012), the SPLA needed to overhaul its modus operandi and the non-representative government established by the CPA (ICG 2011). However, for this to happen, the state needed to maintain cohesion, consolidate its legitimacy and deliver government of its population. Failure to do so would mean it would be only a matter of time before frustrations and dissatisfaction among the population took a violent manifestation.

3.3.2    The SPLA-Southern Population Contract

Upon the signing of the CPA in 2005, the population in south Sudan especially those from the Blue Nile state, Abyei and the Nuba Mountain (South Kordofan) regions became optimistic and began looking forward to their new government to provide benefits and services in return to their support to the movement.

However, to the disappointment of some of the population of Nuba Mountain, Blue Nile and the Abyei region, very few if any of their concerns were addressed in the CPA (Johnson 2011; Ahmed 2010; Young 2012). Although the GoSS made advances in establishing governing structures and legislation, the regional government struggled to provide tangible peace dividends as the state presence was often unnoticeable (ICG 2011). If the argument that the rentier state module adapted by the CPA which put oil as a primary resource upon which south Sudan governance was to be based is to carry any relevance, then the CPAs inability to recognize the manner in which the SPLA mobilised its population to support the rebellion and adequately address it in the agreement proved costly. Furthermore, the inability of the SPLM/A government to expand its tax base beyond the remit of the CPA provision; effectively engage with different sector and regions or even permeates its territory proved problematic for the new state and its population.

[1] The ‘rentier state’ argues that the kind of tax that generates revenues determines the type of governance. It presents that when the state gets its revenue from unearned sources such as oil minerals, it reduces the relationship between state authorities and the civil society as government of oil rich states do not bargain with its citizens to generate revenue hence affecting the proper development and functioning of state institutions (Collier 2000; de Soysa 2000).

[2] Resource curse thesis argues that the abundance of mineral resources provides incentives for activities that seek to earn/maintain or change ownership of property rights to different groups who tends to take violent actions in trying to gain access or control to such resources. The proponent of this thesis asserts that the causes of contemporary civil wars are a result of criminal acquisitive desire (greed) triggered by natural resources such oil minerals (Collier and Hoeffler 1998).